Prevent failures in Golders Green reveal deadly incompetence in UK counterterrorism program

A man arrested in connection with an attack in Golders Green has spotlighted a familiar and worrying question: how did someone with a violent record and a prior referral to the UK’s counter-extremism scheme become classified as no longer a pressing risk? The answers point beyond one case and into the way parts of Britain’s Prevent programme have been prioritizing threats.

Essa Suleiman, a Somali-born British national and former Metropolitan Police interpreter, has been charged with the attempted murder of two Jewish men. His criminal history — including a 2008 assault on a police officer and a police dog that led to an indeterminate sentence — sits uneasily beside records showing he was referred to Prevent in 2020, only for that file to be closed the same year.

Background: Suleiman’s record and the 2020 referral

Suleiman’s past incidents and later interactions with authorities reveal the kind of case that usually triggers closer attention. Key points include:

• Early violent conviction: In 2008 he stabbed a police officer and a police dog with a bread knife, resulting in an indefinite prison term.
• Employment history: He has worked at times as an interpreter for the Metropolitan Police, complicating how agencies perceived his risk.
• Prevent referral and closure: Despite a 2020 referral to Prevent, officials closed the case that same year, meaning no ongoing monitoring by the programme.

The closure of a Prevent file for someone with a documented history of serious violence prompts questions about risk assessment standards, thresholds for intervention, and continuity between criminal justice and deradicalisation channels.

Cases that mirror Suleiman: a pattern of missed risks

This is not an isolated headline. Over the past decade several attackers who later carried out lethal or near-lethal acts had previously been known to Prevent or related programmes, with outcomes that now look like missed opportunities.

Notable examples and brief timelines

• Ali Harbi Ali — The man who murdered Conservative MP David Amess had been through Prevent programmes and was later judged not to pose an immediate threat.
• Khairi Saadallah — Referred to Prevent two years before the Reading stabbings, his case was closed after officers concluded there was no coherent extremist ideology to prosecute.
• Sudesh Amman — Known to Prevent before the Streatham attack in 2019, he carried out a stabbing after release from prison.
• Ahmed Hassan — The Parsons Green bomber was on authorities’ radar prior to the 2017 attack.
• Usman Khan — Once held up as a Prevent rehabilitation success, Khan killed two people at a 2019 conference after being released on licence.

When these cases are looked at together, a troubling theme emerges: referral or participation in Prevent schemes did not necessarily prevent later violent acts.

What the Shawcross Review uncovered about Prevent’s focus

The independent Shawcross Review, published in 2023, questioned some of Prevent’s operating assumptions. It pointed to gaps in training and a culture that, critics argue, has been reluctant to confront Islamist radicalisation explicitly. Among the Review’s findings:

• Only a small fraction of referrals in the year to March 2022 were linked to Islamist radicalisation — a figure far below the prevalence of Islamist-related counter-terrorism cases elsewhere.
• There were reported deficits in staff training and a perceived timidity among practitioners when discussing Islamist extremism.
• Some Prevent workers reportedly avoided using the term “Islamist” for fear it would hinder community engagement.

These dynamics help explain why cases where Islamism was a potential factor may have been deprioritized or closed prematurely.

Shifting priorities: more attention to the far right and “wider influences”

Data and internal reports indicate that the makeup of Prevent referrals has changed over recent years, with Islamist-related referrals dropping sharply while attention to the far right has increased.

• Between 2017 and 2022, referrals tied to Islamist concerns fell markedly — by an estimated 72 percent, according to published figures.
• At the same time, trainers and compliance reviews flagged an overemphasis on extreme-right ideologies relative to the Islamist threat.
• Prevent documents and training materials reportedly catalogued a range of “wider influences” as potential warning signs — including political positions and cultural tastes.

Examples flagged in some materials included a surprisingly broad set of markers, such as an individual’s political views, stances on Brexit or abortion, and even literary or television preferences. These inclusions prompted criticism that Prevent’s net had become too wide and insufficiently targeted.

How misguided indicators and training gaps affect outcomes

When frontline staff are uncertain which behaviours genuinely signal violent radicalisation, the result can be uneven decision-making. Factors that contribute to this problem include:

• Unclear thresholds for intervention: When does concern become a formal risk that requires ongoing action?
• Variable training: Practitioners have reported inconsistent guidance on identifying and responding to Islamist extremism.
• Fear of alienating communities: Some staff avoided direct language around Islamism to preserve engagement, which may have reduced clarity about the nature of threats.

This combination of vague indicators and inadequate preparation risks misclassifying dangerous individuals as low priority.

What the pattern means for public safety and program credibility

Cases like Suleiman’s, and the others listed above, erode confidence that Prevent can reliably spot and manage serious threats. If files are closed quickly or assessments are skewed by concerns about political sensitivities, the programme cannot function as an effective front line of prevention.

Policymakers and practitioners face several questions: Are current training and risk criteria aligned with the actual profile of threats? Is the balance of resources and attention between different types of extremism reflecting the incidence of violence? And crucially, how will Prevent ensure that referrals involving individuals with histories of violence receive sustained scrutiny?

You might also like:

• Anti-Semitic violence stems from Islamism, not the cost of living
• Islamist anti-Semitism poses a lethal threat that cannot be ignored
• UK Islamic blasphemy laws defeated in free speech victory
• Florida man accused of killing and eating pet peacocks during feud with neighbor
• UK asylum system failures putting migrants’ lives at risk

Robert Johnson

Robert Johnson is a dedicated columnist focusing on political and social debates. With twelve years in editorial writing, he provides nuanced, well‑argued perspectives. His commentaries invite you to form your own views and engage in critical issues.