Ukraine war: four years of horror, Europe’s missed chances

Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European capitals still seem caught between two instincts: hope that long-standing transatlantic ties will shield them, and the dawning realization that those ties cannot be the only answer. Voices at the most recent Munich Security Conference underscored the tension — leaders paying lip service to NATO solidarity while privately acknowledging that realistic, long-term defense planning is overdue.

The debate is no longer purely academic. With conflicts reshaping global power balances, Europe faces a strategic moment: either commit to sustained military investment and organizational reform, or accept a longer-term vulnerability at its borders. The choices made now will determine whether European security policy adapts to a new era of contested stability or continues to rely on distant guarantees.

Why Europe still leans on the US — and why that’s changing

European leaders have long treated the United States as the ultimate backstop for continental security. In speeches across Munich, many repeated the old calculus: a NATO attack would trigger American intervention. That confidence, however, is fraying. Recent rhetoric from Washington has jolted policymakers in Brussels and Berlin, forcing a reappraisal of reliance on external guarantees.

What this means in practice:

• European capitals now face pressure to design indigenous deterrence strategies.
• Public and political appetite for large-scale borrowing to finance defense remains limited.
• Discussions have begun about stronger EU-level defense mechanisms as complements — not substitutes — to NATO.

Building real military capacity will take time and money

Deterrence requires more than hand-wringing at conferences. Experts agree that developing credible, independent defensive power will take at least a decade of steady, elevated defense budgets coupled with institutional reforms. Most large European economies are constrained by fiscal limits: rising debt levels, competing social priorities, and political resistance to sustained military borrowing.

What Europe needs to acquire and sustain

• Integrated air-defense networks and long-range missile systems.
• Modern fighter jets, main battle tanks, and mechanized formations.
• Reliable ammunition production and spare-parts supply chains.
• A larger pool of trained, combat-ready personnel able to operate complex systems.

Without a political consensus to fund these programs consistently, investment cycles will likely remain stop-start — exactly the vulnerability that adversaries may exploit.

Ukraine’s experience as a warning and a lesson

Ukraine’s ordeal since 2022 illustrates the consequences of being underprepared for high-intensity warfare. The country’s initial resistance was driven as much by civic mobilization and improvisation as by conventional military readiness. Ordinary citizens and local volunteers helped blunt early advances — a human story of courage that masks the systemic gaps in preparedness.

Economically, the toll has been staggering. Estimates put Ukraine’s direct cost of conflict at roughly $175 million per day — a figure that excludes broader losses such as GDP decline, ruined infrastructure, lost wages, and the long tail of reconstruction. Beyond materiel, Ukraine’s urgent needs underline a key point: modern warfare demands not only hardware but trained crews to use it effectively.

Ukraine’s operational shortfalls show why Europe must plan for both equipment and people:

1. Weapons without trained operators are of limited value.
2. Air defenses and munitions require logistics and maintenance infrastructures that take years to establish.
3. Strategic resilience depends on a reserve force and mobilization systems that can be scaled quickly.

Leadership, experience and the gap in high-intensity combat command

Another strain on Europe’s defenses is institutional experience. Many senior officers in European armies have spent decades preparing for peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and expeditionary operations — very different from high-intensity, combined-arms warfare. Command experience above brigade level in sustained, large-scale combat is scarce.

To close that gap, militaries will need to:

• Prioritize large-scale exercises that replicate sustained combat conditions.
• Update doctrine and training for combined arms, logistics, and electronic warfare.
• Invest in career pathways that rotate commanders through formations capable of operating at corps and theater levels.

These are structural changes that cannot be implemented overnight, reinforcing the argument for multi-year planning and predictable funding.

Shifting security arrangements: new pacts and revived ideas

As debate intensifies, some European leaders are revisiting older models of continental cooperation and exploring new variants of collective defense that could sit alongside NATO. Proposals range from reviving a Western European-type defense arrangement to creating flexible EU-led pacts that include non-EU partners like the UK and Norway.

At the same time, diplomatic efforts to end the fighting in Ukraine continue with uneven results. Recent trilateral talks in Geneva, brokered by the United States, produced little substantive movement; Ukrainian negotiators publicly thanked American mediation while signaling that progress remains limited. That mix of diplomatic inertia and military stalemate suggests the conflict will not be resolved through a single negotiation round.

What Europe must decide next to avoid repeating past mistakes

Europe’s strategic choices are clear even if they are politically difficult. Policymakers must decide whether to:

• Commit to long-term, predictable defense spending and modernization programs.
• Reform military training and command structures to create experience for high-intensity conflict.
• Establish stronger industrial and logistical cooperation for weapons, munitions, and sustainment.

Failure to act could leave European states vulnerable to the same pattern of surprise and improvisation that cost Ukraine dearly in 2022. The alternative is a hard, sustained investment in deterrence that reshapes Europe’s strategic posture over a generation.

Sergey Maidukov is a Ukrainian writer and the author of Life on the Run: One Family’s Search for Peace in War-torn Ukraine.

You might also like:

• Coalition of wishful thinking undercuts chances for meaningful reform
• EU drone wall unrealistic and ineffective, experts warn
• Europe still relies on U.S. security support
• Zelensky corruption scandal threatens presidency and Ukraine’s international support
• Trump Renames Defense Department: Now Called “Department of War”

Robert Johnson

Robert Johnson is a dedicated columnist focusing on political and social debates. With twelve years in editorial writing, he provides nuanced, well‑argued perspectives. His commentaries invite you to form your own views and engage in critical issues.